Introduction
During the last two decades the analysis of major market moving news events has grown into an own eld of research within nance. A substantial increase in the understanding of how information leads to asset reactions and price discovery was the result of this development. Of course this was amplied by the availability of enhanced computational capacities and the emergence of an increasingly information-driven business world. Using larger amounts of data made more intraday and ultra-high frequency data analyses possible. However, the ongoing debate about announcement eects among researchers and practitioners and anecdotal evidence about market-driving news in media reports shows that there is still need for a better understanding of announcement eects and market behavior.
Since market commentators often claim that US announcements are the reason for European stock market reactions on certain trading days, it is highly interesting and necessary to investigate scientically whether this is true. If indeed the claimed eects are present, it is of utmost importance to investigate how European stocks in detail are aected by the announcements. To the best of our knowledge only the study by Harju and Hussain (2011) is focusing on the consequences of US macroeconomic announcements for European stock markets, thereby using high-frequency data. We analyze the eects of US macroeconomic announcements such as the disclosure of the unemployment rate, and focus on the reactions of European stock market (i) returns, (ii) return volatility and (iii) bid-ask spreads. We use index and stock-individual 5-minute intraday data from 2013 until 2014 for the three variables. 1 All of those should be aected by US announcements, for two reasons: (i) News about the US economic outlook can lead to a change in the fundamental value of a stock if the company is exposed directly or indirectly to the US market 2 (ii) A change in the global economic outlook after important US announcements might lead to market-wide changes in the fundamental values of assets.
1 There is a hard sample limit induced by the fact that data providers like Bloomberg successively need to delete (ultra)high-frequency data due to storage capacities. 2 For example in the case of an European car producer having large sale volumes in the US.
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Profound knowledge of market behavior around announcements can help to improve market eciency when more insight into price discovery processes and market reactions due to new information is achieved. Practitioners can benet from a deeper understanding in this eld by improving trading strategies based on information, and by avoiding higher spread periods for trades in investment strategies with horizons exceeding the daily dimension. Like Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) (1992), the size of bid-ask spreads might depend on risk and information so we decompose the bid-ask spread into a volatility-related component (proxying for risk or at least uncertainty), and an information component.
We provide an overview table on the most important literature concerning macroeconomic announcement eects using intraday data in the Appendix (Table A1) . Naturally the results diverge between the studies, because they all have a slightly dierent focus concerning which announcements are used, use a dierent data basis, or focus on dierent countries. From the literature, there is strong evidence for an inuence of at least some macroeconomic announcements on nancial market variables. Harju and Hussain (2011) provide evidence for strong eects of US announcements on European markets, but focus on stock indices only, rather than on individual stocks. A stock-specic analysis, however, would be necessary to evaluate if the eects are common for all stocks or if there might be diering reactions among them.
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways: (i) Most studies analyze macroeconomic eects on US assets, and often these studies focus on foreign exchange markets, bond markets or stock indices. This paper, however, turns the light on European stocks, using most recent data and employing the most important US announcements.
(ii) The use of stock-individual regressions in addition to index-based analyses is new as well: As can be seen from the rst table in the Appendix (Table A1) , studies about 5 stock markets mostly use stock indices to investigate announcement impacts. But if certain assets strongly react to a given announcement while others are not or only slightly aected, an index-based analysis will be misleading. Relying on these results will lead to false assumptions about reactions in both groups, based on an averaging out of impacts.
Furthermore, it is interesting to disentangle market-wide and stock-specic impacts of macroeconomic announcements. To provide comprehensive insights into the reaction of stocks to announcements, we conduct index-based analyses, stock-specic analyses and stock-specic analyses controlling for the market-wide news impact. To our knowledge this hasn't been done before and the results provide evidence that a stock-specic analysis is of high worth.
(iii) Finally it is also of great interest if macroeconomic announcements have eects not only on returns and volatility, but also on spreads that may be seen as representative of transaction costs. Since the analysis of spread reactions in the context of announcement studies is rarely done so far and is new in the context of foreign country announcement eects for stocks, we contribute in this area as well.
The study is structured as follows: In the next section we briey discuss the theoretical reasoning behind possible announcement impacts. Further we present the data used in our investigation and how it is prepared for the empirical investigation. The estimation methodology is discussed in Section 3. Section 4 states the results and provides a discussion of the economic implications. The nal section concludes and motivates further research in this area.
Theory and Data Preparation
As outlined above, we focus on reactions in (i) returns, (ii) volatility, and (iii) spreads.
Below we discuss the economic reasoning behind possible announcement-driven eects on the three variables.
Macroeconomic announcements can aect the fundamental value (real value) of stocks through new information in the announcement that is relevant for specic stocks and/or the general market. A change in the fundamental value in turn triggers price adjustments in stocks: in a fully ecient market the price adjustment will directly occur after new in-6 formation arrives at the market, and the new stock price will reect the new fundamental value. However, Kim and Verrecchia (1994) point out that it is arguable that all market participants are fully and equally able to interpret the consequences of news arriving at the market. Following this argumentation we assume a price discovery process that is observable through price adjustments. This adjustment process is expected to start directly with the news release and to last for a while. Because of liquidity-motivated trades and incorrect price assumption adjustments of some market participants it might also be possible to observe overshooting reactions followed by price reversions. Overall, we assume that good news will lead to an increase in stock prices and bad news to a decrease. Thereby, the adjustment size depends on the strength of the new information.
For return volatility there is already evidence that on days prior to pre-scheduled announcements volatility goes down and market participants wait for the news release to alter investment decisions, or to trade on new information.
3 However, we are not focusing on calendar eects but on the impact of the actual new information contained in the announcement. Because of the price discovery process we assume that the volatility will increase immediately after an announcement, regardless whether it contains good or bad news, and that volatility will remain higher for a while. Like the adjustment in prices, it is reasonable that the size of the volatility increase depends on the strength of the news.
The assumed spread reaction is that bid-ask spreads will rise with new information, again regardless of the information direction and based on two reasons: First, higher market volatility leads to higher holding risks. An increase in market volatility makes a large price movement in the near future more likely.
4 While this depends on the assumed reaction of volatility as discussed in the previous paragraph, the second reason stands for itself: If dierent market participants are dierently able to adequately interpret the new information, market makers and participants acting like market makers face a higher risk of adverse selection. To prevent from a loss due to that, they have to set higher spreads 3 Bomm (2003) for example provides evidence on pre-announcement eects. 4 See for instance Copeland and Galai (1983) and Bollerslev and Melvin (1994 tural break in our sample we start in 2013. However, since we are using 5-minutes data we still have enough data points for our estimations and we increase robustness further by using dierent stocks and two dierent sources for market expectations. A summary of the Euro Stoxx 50 index constituents can be found in Table A2 . The announcements used are shown in Table A3 .
The log return of the mid-price between bid and ask quotes is the basis for the investigation of stocks' return (and volatility) adjustments to news, as the use of actual transaction prices could lead to a bias caused by the bid-ask bounce: if a trade in time t occurs at the bid (ask) price, it is possible that the return in t + 1 is positive (negative) without any change in the fundamental value. This can be the case if the trade in t + 1 occurs at the ask (bid) and is purely caused by the dierent prices for buying and selling a stock (bid-ask spread). This phenomenon increases with the spread size. Because of the previously discussed higher spreads surrounding macroeconomic announcements, this problem would be amplied further. To perform the index-based analysis, we construct a return series using the mid-prices of the 50 individual stocks weighted by their market capitalization at the beginning of March 2013.
For the investigation of spread size eects of macroeconomic announcements we use the relative quoted spread calculated by the dierence of the best bid and the best ask price at the end of every 5-minute period divided by their midprice. 6 The standard trading hours on the main Euro-area stock exchanges are between 9:00 and 17:00 CET. To avoid noise and disturbances shortly after the market opening and before closing, we exclude the rst and the last 5-minute periods for every trading day. This is non-hazardous for our analyses since we are excluding the same 5-minute periods for all trading days and no announcement examined in our study occurs at the very beginning or at the end of a European trading day.
As already mentioned in the introduction, we focus on US announcements to gain more insight into the eects of US announcements on European markets. We use all macroeconomic US announcements which are assigned as market moving events by the Bloomberg calendar, as well as some additional news releases which also seem to be accompanied by higher market media attention.
To measure pure news eects we have to focus on news surprises which are the deviations of the announcement size from the expected size, because if the magnitude of an announcement is already completely expected by all market participants, the actual announcement will not bring any information driving prices or variables. Additionally, we have to standardize the announcement surprises, as dierent announcements are measured in dierent units. We follow Balduzzi et al. (2001) by using the commonly used standardization procedure:
6 High frequency data occasionally contains data errors. To avoid biases due to outliers coming from data errors, we winsorize the data on very low levels. For example when using the 99.9% level, the 0.1% extreme observations are winsorized. 
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The announcement surprise S kt is dened as the dierence between the actual announcement size A kt of announcement k in period t and the market expectation E kt of the announcement size, divided by the sample standard deviationσ k of (A kt − E kt ) for the respective announcement k. 8 The information about the announcements as well as the market expectations are taken from the Financial Times Economic Calendar. For robustness checks we repeat all our estimations with market expectations data from the Bloomberg Economic Calendar. In their seminal paper Andersen and Bollerslev (1997) nd strong intraday cyclical pattern for foreign exchange and equity data. They point out that direct ARCH modeling of the intraday return volatility would be hazardous. 10 This is because these models are not capable of modeling regular cyclical pattern which are existent in many markets on an intraday frequency. Instead they suggest to use a Fourier Flexible Form (FFF) 11 part in intraday models to account for the cyclical pattern and an interday conditional heteroscedasticity part to account for the well known daily eects. Based on this, Andersen et al. (2003) and many authors following, used a WLS approach. This is evident from Table A1 as well. This approach consists of a mean equation and a variance equation accounting for the intraday volatility pattern including an FFF.
Using the WLS approach became standard in the eld of macroeconomic announcement eect studies if the data shows intraday cyclical pattern. Recent evidence by Harju and Hussain (2011) for stock markets as well as graphical inspections of our own data conrms intraday seasonality in stock markets. Additionally, a methodology-comparison study by Laakkonen (2013) also supports to use the FFF-method to lter out intraday seasonality pattern. Therefore we apply a model similar to the one in Andersen et al. (2003) for our return and volatility analysis: 8 As pointed out by Andersen et al. (2003) this standardization does not aect statistical signicance or the regression t. 9 The terms announcement eect, news eect or announcement surprise impact are used synonymously in the rest of the study and all refer to the eect of S kt . 10 Andersen and Bollerslev (1997), p. 125. 11 Discussed by Gallant (1981) .
Equation (2) gives the mean equation of our empirical setup which models the stock return (respectively index return in the index-based analysis) R t at time t by using au- 13 The calendar eect bracket consists of the FFF cosine and sine terms to model the intraday periodicity. Again the number of terms chosen for the estimation varies across dierent studies but based on the information criteria we have chosen Q = 7. Four dummy variables were included to account for day of the week eects (D r ) and another dummy variable (NY ) accounts for the time after 15:30 CET. This is to control for higher volatility on the European 12 We have also tested for market reactions due to information leakage in advance to the ocial release time (negative J). There was no signicant eect detectable, so we omitted leads from the analysis. We rst perform this analysis for the index and then for the individual stocks. Afterwards we include the index return series as an explanatory variable in Equation (2).
With this procedure we are controlling for the market-wide eects of the news events and the resulting coecients give us the pure and isolated stock-individual impact of the announcements, i.e., net of the market index impact.
For the estimation of the spread reaction, we apply a straightforward setup: as pointed out by McInish and Wood (1992), intraday periodicity can also be observed for bidask spreads. This is in line with our previous theoretical discussion about how price volatility is inuencing spreads. Consequently, it seems natural for us to include the return volatility series constructed by Equation (3) as an explanatory variable in a bidask spread estimation equation. By this we can disentangle the spread eect into a volatility-related component and an information component:
SP t is the realized quoted spread measured by the dierence between the last bid and ask price of the respective 5-minute period, divided by the mid of the bid and ask price. We again use I = 3 as suggested by information criteria for the AR terms and J = 2 for the announcement surprise lags. (ε t − u t ) is the volatility proxy as estimated by Equation (3) and v t is another i.i.d. error term. The announcement surprises are used in absolute terms since microstructure literature suggests that uncertainty about the information has an impact on fundamental values, and that it is not the direction of the new information that leads to a spread increase. Finally we also include the index return series in absolute terms for times of announcements and their lags in Equation (4), in order to control for possible impacts of market wide volatility increases. Thus, this correction is analogous to the index adjustments for the return and volatility analyses as outlined above. We discuss all results in the next section, starting with the stock index estimation results, followed by the stock-individual results both with and without controlling for market-wide inuences.
Results

Index Results
Return Estimations
We rst discuss the results of the index estimations. The second column of Table   1 shows the strong autoregressive pattern in the index returns, while the size of the 13 Table 1 shows the main index estimation results for returns and volatility. The return results correspond to equation (2), the volatility results correspond to equation (3). The rst part depicts the constant, autoregressive and daily volatility coecients. The second part gives the announcement coecients. Cont. stands for the contemporaneous, Lag 1 and Lag 2 for the rst and the second 5-minute lag inuence. *,** and *** indicate statistical signicance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Due to parsimony reasons we have omitted the presentation of control variables or standard deviations.
coecients is quite small. It may be argued that one should use heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors instead of the WLS approach. While Andersen et al. (2003) point out that the WLS approach should be more ecient, a crucial advantage of the WLS approach is that we can analyze the intraday volatility as well. Nevertheless, we double-checked the return results using HAC-standard errors. This lead to qualitatively the same results, although with more signicant coecients. Table 1 reveals that just 12 out of 22 announcements have a signicant impact on the stock index returns. Whenever signicant, signs of the announcements are mostly reasonable: The ISM Manufacturing Index, Retail Sales, Consumer Condence, New Home Sales and Existing Home Sales show positive signs for the contemporaneous or rst lag reaction. Thus, positive announcement surprises, meaning an unanticipated increase (or weaker decrease) in the variable leads to an increase in stock prices. These variables can be seen as positive indicators for the US economy in the sense that an increase brightens the economic outlook for the US and the world economy. The negative and signicant impact of the Unemployment Rate in the second lag goes in the same argumentative direction. A rise in unemployment darkens the economic outlook or at least is a negative indicator on recent economic developments, so one expects a negative sign for this variable. Consumer Price Index and the Personal Income surprises have negative inuence. Both variables are indicators for higher ination (risks) in the US. A higher ination (risk) rises the probability of a change away from the quantitative easing strategy of the Fed, so is a sign of higher interest rates in the long run. Higher interest rates make other investments than stocks (i.e. bonds) more protable leading to an overall stock price depreciation. While Personal Income may have had an impact on the positive side due to being a signal for an expanding economy, this apparently is outweighed by the ination aspects and future expected developments.
Overall, the sizes of the signicant coecients does not seem to be very high at rst glance. However, the index return standard deviation is 0.0761%, so for example a one standard deviation macroeconomic news surprise in the Retail Sales with a coecient of 0.0793% leads to a return jump of about one standard deviation. Analogously, a one standard deviation surprise in the ISM Manufacturing Index with a coecient of 0.1449% leads to a two standard deviation return jump. The only somewhat puzzling results are that the Industrial Production, Durable Goods Orders and Housing Starts are signicant and negative on the second lag. Using market expectations data from the Bloomberg Economic Calendar for robustness checking results in the same signs but with insignicant coecients for Industrial Production and Housing Starts. Comparing our results to the results found by Harju and Hussain (2011) is just possible for the contemporaneous coecients, since they do not report their lagged variable results. For the contemporaneous announcement impacts the results are broadly in line, except that our results show a smaller amount of signicant announcements. Speaking of this, the fact that contemporaneous eects as well as lagged eects are used may be a cause for insignicant coecients as well. Identication of which variable is signicant may be clouded by a spreading of market reactions and adjustments over several time points, hindering statistical inference on purely technical grounds. In addition, Unemploymentrate and Non-farm Payrolls for example are announced on the same time. Given that those two measures should be correlated adds further to the problem of identication in this setup. Lastly, the fact that the announcements may have diering inuence on the specic stocks constituting the index may have led to averaging out of eects at least for some announcements.
Volatility Estimations
The estimation of Equation (3), the volatility equation, reveals overall increasing volatility in European stock markets after important US macroeconomic news. This is evident from the results presented in column 3 of Table 1 , and 10 out of 22 announcements have signicant impact. Other authors investigating information releases argue that the market volatility decreases before new information is released. This is because investors wait for the news about stocks before they alter their portfolio decisions. 15 After the news have hit the market, the changed perception of the true fundamental value of the respective asset(s) leads to portfolio adjustments of investors, thereby increasing the volatility. So this is in line with our ndings, and only the negative signicant volatility coecient for the New Home Sales is surprising. Given that the recent nancial market crisis originated in the subprime market meltdown, one explanation would be that the US housing market is still seen with caution and that surprises on the upside have a calming down eect.
The interday volatility, measured by a standard GARCH(1,1) specication, is highly signicant and positive as expected. Not depicted here but also highly signicant and positive is the NY dummy variable indicating that the volatility is indeed higher when the US markets are open. Finally, the day of the week eects are also important as can be seen from an increasing volatility over the week. Another interesting insight is that especially on
Thursday there is a peak around 14:30. This is when many important US macroeconomic announcements are released and this peak gives visual evidence on the eect for European markets.
Given the fact that most but not all coecients are in the right direction and not all announcement eects are signicant, it is interesting to see how this turns out when focusing on specic stocks, rather than focusing on the pooled results from the indexbased estimations. It is of special interest to see whether the apparently wrong signs that were obtained for some announcements, and the insignicance of others, is an eect of averaging out. We are able to answer these questions in the next sections. Furthermore, as stock-specic numbers are used, we are able to analyze the spreads as well, leading to insight on eects beyond return and risk, namely the pricing behavior in the presence of news ows. Figure 3 provides rst evidence on why it is important to conduct stock-specic estimations to gain additional insight on how announcements aect markets.
Detailed information which stock is inuenced by which announcement is available upon request. From Figure 3 it is obvious that the amount of signicant announcements strongly varies across the dierent stocks. So even though we are looking at a sample of quite similar stocks in the sense that they are all European blue chips, the announcement impacts are dierent. Additionally checking for the branch of the companies and the country reveals that eight companies whose returns are inuenced by most announcements (16, 15 and 14) are from seven dierent countries and seven dierent branches. On the other hand, companies with less signicant inuences are of diering sectors and countries as well. Thus, pooling of companies even in smaller groups may average out structures.
This shows how crucial a stock-specic analysis is. It also makes perfect sense from a theoretical point of view: The rst possible impact path discussed at the beginning of the study was the stock-individual US exposure impact. The strength of this path can vary dramatically even between quite common companies. While one car producer might for example be strongly aected by US news because of an important position in the US market, another producer's stock price might just barely react, given an Asian market focus. The second impact path, namely the whole market impact, is also quite heterogeneous between dierent stocks. As we know from asset pricing studies, there are stocks with high beta (market risk) and stocks with low beta. Naturally a market-wide reaction will aect low beta stocks much less than high beta stocks.
Another interesting result is that the amount of signicant announcements varies strongly between the endogenous variables. There are on average much more announcements signicant on spreads and much less signicant on volatility than on returns. This shows that even if an announcement has no signicant eect on return or on volatility, it might still be inuential to information asymmetry and price uncertainty among market participants, resulting in dierent spreads than during other times. The following subsections discuss the announcement-specic results for the three estimated stock-specic variables. for very short-term returns. Furthermore it is just signicant for 5 estimations on the 10% level. The rst two autoregressive terms are signicant for over 40, the third for only 13 stocks, further indicating an overall proper setup as discussed in the last section. 16 The rst eight columns after the announcement description in the table show the amount 16 Note that due to parsimony reasons the control variable results for the estimations are not depicted in detail. Table 2 show the amount of stocks which are signicantly (at least on the 10% level) aected by the respective announcement. The other columns show the average of the ve most signicant coecients (rst decile) of the respective announcement. Cont. stands for the contemporaneous, L(1) and L(2) for the rst and the second 5-minute lag inuence. A.l.o. indicates that at least at one lag a signicant inuence on the endogenous variable can be found. Red numbers have to be interpreted with caution since we don't have (a sucient number of) signicant coecients here. of signicant announcements. First of all we can see that no announcement type has an eect on all stocks. In many cases the announcements have impacts on just half of the stocks or even less. This again supports the notion that stock-individual investigations are highly recommendable.
Return Results
Second, the results are overall plausible since they show the assumed impact direction for the dierent announcements. As in the case of the index-based estimation, the returns of many stocks are positively aected by contemporaneous positive surprises in the ISM Manufacturing Index, the Retail sales, Existing Home Sales and New Home Sales. However, the results here reveal that there are much more announcements having a positive signicant impact at least for a couple of stocks, i.e. for instance the ADP Employments Survey, the Non-farm Payrolls or the Capacity Utilization. These results are all reason-able since they are positive indicators for the US economy. Contemporaneous, negative and signicant eects are just seen for the Consumer Price Index, which is backed by the index results and for the Initial Claims which is a new result but reasonable since it is a negative indicator. The news in Unemployment, Consumer Condence, Housing Starts and Personal Income seem to work with some lag but overall in reasonable direction.
Results for the lagged news announcements also reveal additional information about the few puzzling results in the index-based estimation: we can observe that for some announcements the lagged impacts are counter-intuitive. The second lag coecient of Durable Goods Orders and Housing Starts for example shows a negative signicant impact on a mentionable amount of stocks which is in line with the index-based estimation, but not with economic intuition. However, we can observe that these variables have strong contemporaneous or rst lag impacts on many stocks in the economically reasonable (positive) direction. So this phenomenon points at an initial overreaction to the announcement followed by a mean-reverting process. This was already discussed in the theoretical section and can be explained by the dierent (in)abilities of market participants to interpret the implications of the news event for the fundamental value of the respective assets. Additionally, we have checked if it is the same stocks that rst have increasing prices and then decreasing ones on later lags, this indeed holds true and is good news in terms of reliability and sensibility of the results. The only announcement which still provides a puzzling result is the Industrial Production, and there are some other indicators which are generally not relevant, for example the Empire State Survey or the Trade Balance.
The last three columns give the average coecient of the 5 most signicantly aected stocks of the respective announcement and lag. Note that the depicted coecients on dierent lags are not necessarily from the same stocks. As pointed out in the data section, the announcement surprises are standardized, so the coecients give the impact of a one standard deviation macroeconomic news surprise. 17 Overall, the coecients support our Table 3 show the amount of stocks which are signicantly (at least on the 10% level) aected by the respective announcement. The later columns show the average of the ve most signicant coecients (rst decile) of the respective announcement. Cont. stands for the contemporaneous, L(1) and L(2) for the rst and the second 5-minute lag inuence. A.l.o. indicates that at least at one lag a signicant inuence on the endogenous variable can be found. Red numbers have to be interpreted with caution since we don't have (a sucient number of) signicant coecients here.
ndings of mean-reverting price adjustment processes at least for some announcements. It also shows that the overall eects mostly are in the assumed direction. For example in the case of Durable Goods Orders we see a strong, positive contemporaneous and rst lag price increase and a decrease on the second lag. However, the sum stays positive. The size of the coecients is reasonable with the strongest eect seen for Non-farm Payrolls with a positive impact of 0.21 percentage points and ISM Manufacturing Index with a positive impact of 0.18 percentage points on the 5-minute returns for the ve most signicantly aected stocks. This is a clear positive signal for the US economy and might also be positive for Europe.
However, if the surprise in this announcement comes from a sharp and unexpected drop in imports to the US it might darken the world economic outlook and especially the 23 outlook for European exporters to the US. In the rst case one can expect a positive return reaction, in the second case one can expect a negative return reaction, but in both cases it is reasonable that volatility goes up. This reasoning explains why we do not see a clear impact for returns but for volatility in this announcement.
The direction of the volatility impacts overall is quite reasonable for most announcements. Almost all announcement types with a signicant impact lead to an increase in volatility. This is in line with economic reasoning as discussed in Section 2. There are only a couple of announcements which have a signicant and negative impact on the volatility of some stocks. Worth to mention here is the Consumer Condence, however, whose impact is only negative and signicant on the rst and second lag and might indicate a more quite phase in the market after the adjustment process to the news has already occurred earlier. The coecient sizes are all reasonable with the Housing Starts and Unemployment announcement having the strongest volatility impact for the ve most signicantly aected stocks.
Spread Results
Finally we turn to the results of the bid-ask spread estimations. Again for parsimony reasons we do not display the control variables in detail but discuss them briey hereafter.
For all stocks the constant term is positive and signicant on the 1% level with an average size of 0.0187 (recall that the spreads are measured in percent of the stock price which is the midpoint between ask and bid), so the basis-spread is on average 0.0187% of the stock price. For 48 out of 50 stocks the stock price volatility variable constructed by Equation (3) is positive and statistically signicant on the 1% level. This gives strong support to our view that the return volatility (daily and intraday) has a strictly positive impact on spreads and is perfectly in line with microstructure theory. However, how strong is this eect? The average coecient over all 50 stocks is 0.0968. If we take the mean of the volatility variable (ε t − u t ) of the index-based estimations as a volatility benchmark-value (0.0525%), we would have an impact on the spread of 0.0051 percentage points which is in turn a 27% markup on the constant. The higher holding risk in times of higher volatility is one major part of the bid-ask spread. Table 4 show the amount of stocks which are signicantly (at least on the 10% level) aected by the respective announcement. The later columns show the average of the ve most signicant coecients (rst decile) of the respective announcement. Cont. stands for the contemporaneous, L(1) and L(2) for the rst and the second 5-minute lag inuence. A.l.o. indicates that at least at one lag a signicant inuence on the endogenous variable can be found.
The other part in our estimations comes from asymmetric information considerations, and these impacts can be seen directly from the results of the announcements in Table 4 . The AR terms are almost always highly signicant and positive. It can be argued that one could include more autoregressive terms for some stocks, however, we account for that by using Newey-West autoregressive and heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors in the spread estimation. Additionally, the Durbin-Watson statistic for all regressions shows a value of between 2.0 and 2.1, so no serial correlation is evident. The average R-Squared is 0.1861. Table 4 shows a summary of estimation results concerning the eect of macroeconomic announcements on relative bid-ask spreads.
The results show the pure impact of the announcement surprises net of the eect which might come from higher return volatility, since we are controlling for that. It is remarkable that all announcements in our investigation seem to have an eect on the spreads of many dierent stocks. It is also observable that in the period after an announcement, the signicant spread eects are almost always positive, indicating an increase in spreads. This can be explained by higher information asymmetry as it is discussed in the model section. Nevertheless, the information asymmetry does not seem to stay long in the market since the signicant rst and second lags mostly show a negative sign. It shows that the uncertainty about the news impact decreases completely in the rst 5 minutes after the announcement and is followed partially by a low uncertainty phase compared to the constant estimated. This is reasonable since after such a marketmoving news event other important news releases are not that likely and adjustments were already made based on the news ow. The constant on the other hand will be inuenced by low uncertainty phases as well as some higher uncertainty phases, such as around other stock-specic relevant news releases. Overall, these results show that US announcements strongly aect the asymmetric information in European stock markets. Most interesting is that a spread increase occurs even for announcements and stocks where returns and volatilities seem to be just barely aected or not at all. This shows that even if we do not see a signicant reaction in returns and volatility, asymmetric information can still rise and market makers and market participants acting as liquidity suppliers still protect themselves against potential informed trading surrounding announcements. This leads to the important insight that announcements which in the literature so far have been regarded as not being important can indeed be important from an information and trading cost point of view, that is, when analyses go beyond return and dispersion investigations. 
Stock-individual results net of index eects
After performing the index-based estimations and the stock-specic estimations, we are interested in the results when controlling for index returns. We have performed the estimations of the previous subsection, now extended by including the index returns for the times and lags of US macroeconomic announcements. 18 The results for the constant and autoregressive terms in the return estimations do not change much in comparison to the estimations without the index return series. Interestingly, the index return series is signicant and positive for all stocks and the coecient ranges from 0.67 to 1.64. This term can be interpreted similar to the classical market beta that we know from asset pricing literature. This span is reasonable and in addition shows that we can expect strong variation between the stocks when controlling for the market inuence.
We omit to display the results here as we have done it in the last sub-sections, because we do not gain much additional insight into the behavior of the stocks when focusing just on summary results. Many announcements are statistically positive for some stocks and negative for others. Taking for instance the Unemployment rate, we have a signicant and positive impact on 11 and a signicant and negative impact on 15 stocks. This is because one stock can be dierently aected by dierent announcements.
The inclusion of the market return leads to an alternative interpretation of the announcement specic variables than in the previous section: They do not give the complete impact for a stock due to the announcement any more, but serve as correction variables for the divergence of the stock specic announcement reaction from the overall market reaction of the stock. Suppose a stock has a market index coecient of 1, then the return reaction due to announcement eects has on average the same strength as for the overall market index, as the returns of the stock and the index should move in tandem. However, if there is now an announcement included which does not aect this specic stock but the market index (for example positively) then the coecient of this announcement must Table 5 shows an example stock return estimation without including the index as a explanatory variable compared to the estimation results including the index return. Cont. stands for the contemporaneous, Lag 1 and Lag 2 for the rst and the second 5-minute lag inuence. *,** and *** indicate statistical signicance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Due to parsimony reasons we have omitted the presentation of control variables or standarddeviations.
correct for that fact (will be negative). Accordingly, the correction coecients deliver insight into the relative strengths of reactions between stocks and the index. In addition, this setup can reveal a very important result, namely that we indeed have a noteworthy number of signicant correction coecients. This points again at the importance of stock-specic investigations. For illustrative reasons Table 5 gives the estimation results for the stock with the beta coecient closest to 1 in our sample (stock 22).
The respective parts of the table state the results without and with controlling for the index return. We can see that this stock is signicantly and positively aected by the ISM Manufacturing Index with a contemporaneous impact. The contemporaneous coecient for this announcement in the second estimation shows a negative sign but is insignicant. The index results in Table 1 reveal a slightly lower coecient for this announcement, explaining the negative but insignicant coecient. The same holds true for the other announcements and we can see that this setup can be used to disentangle the stock-specic eects from the reactions due to movements in the overall market. In detail, the change from signicant to insignicant coecients shows that the previous nding of a specic impact indeed has an eect on the respective stock return, but it is not the announcement that drives the return, it is the market movement.
For the volatility estimates the picture is quite clear as well: after using the index return in the mean equation we overall have almost no signicant and positive announcement. As we have seen in Table 1 , many announcements aect either almost all or almost no stock in our sample, so we have either a market-wide reaction or no volatility reaction.
19 However, there are more signicant and negative coecients than without the index return in the mean equation. This is especially the case for the announcements where just about half of the stocks were aected, for instance ISM Manufacturing, ISM Non-Manufacturing and Philadelphia Fed Survey. This points at the fact that these announcements are just aecting parts of the market. It is also the case for announcements with already negative coecients in the estimation in the last subsection (i.e. Consumer Condence).
Finally, we are interested in the spread estimation, augmented by the absolute market return series. Indeed our estimates reveal that the new variable shows a signicant and positive sign for all stocks, indicating that market-wide volatility is inuential for stockspecic bid-ask spreads and this is a new insight. The average coecient size over all 50 stocks is 0.0557. The average coecient size for the stock individual volatility variable is 0.0958 and the average constant is 0.0189%, so it has not changed much. The average RSquared is 0.1877 and did not really increase compared to the previous spread estimations.
This comes as no surprise since we just have included the index returns for the time of announcements and their lags. Most interesting is how the actual news coecients have 19 Remind that we are using the absolute residual return as our endogenous variable in the volatility equation.
29 changed and here we do not see any major changes. Overall, the coecients are a bit smaller for the positive (contemporaneous) variables and in absolute terms a bit larger for the negative (lagged) variables. However, the changes are not strong and there are just minor changes in the amount of signicant coecients, so we omitted the presentation of a result table here. Overall, the argumentation of the last subsection concerning spreads still holds true and is augmented by the result that market-wide volatility also aects spreads.
Conclusion
In this study we have shown that certain US macroeconomic announcements matter for European stock markets. While index-based estimations give insight into the eects on average, a detailed stock-wise analysis revealed that the importance of announcements varies strongly between dierent stocks, advocating stock-individual analysis as a crucial tool to understand stock market reactions to news events. Controlling for market returns in stock-specic estimations helps to understand how the behavior of certain stocks diers from the overall market reactions due to announcements, since it is possible to disentangle market-wide from stock-specic reactions in this setup. Some news surprises such as the ISM Manufacturing Index or the Unemployment numbers aect the returns and volatility of many stocks in our sample, while other announcements like the Empire State Survey have virtually no eects. Additionally, the direction of news is important for returns. If an announcement has a statistically signicant inuence, then good news lead to a positive eect on stock returns and bad news lead to a negative eect. Return volatility tends to rise shortly after important announcements. Interestingly, almost all US announcements in the sample have signicant eects on quoted relative bid-ask spreads of European stocks. This points at the importance of the analysis of news events even if they are assumed to be unimportant to return and volatility. The spreads tend to be drastically higher right after the announcement but seem to be followed by a low spread phase 5 minutes later, which is a signal for a quick decrease in information asymmetry in the market. Furthermore, both stock-specic and market volatility seem to play an important role for the size of bid-ask spreads.
Stock-specic analyses of macroeconomic news eects on volatility and returns for European markets are rare and the analysis of their spreads is almost not investigated in this kind of a setup. With this study we ll this research gap. We argue that researchers and practitioners focusing on European stock markets have to take into account the stock-individual eects of US announcements in their analyses and decisions. Even if stock returns and volatility seem not to react to a certain announcement, information asymmetry might still have an important eect as they lead to higher transaction costs in the market. 
